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COMMENT
Calvin P. Griffith, Esq.f
I. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
The most pronounced development in the area of claim con-
struction over the past year relates directly to the predictability
issue, and perhaps to the reversal rate that has been bandied about
in this Symposium. I speak of the Federal Circuit's increased em-
phasis on the use of dictionaries.
Mr. Filardi mentioned dictionary usage as one of the canons
of claim construction.' While dictionaries have always been a re-
source available for claim construction, they have recently gone to
the head of the class in terms of their importance in construing
claims. The reason for this may be the lack of predictability ex-
perienced in recent years with respect to claim construction. For
example, many practitioners had been frustrated by the Federal
Circuit's "single embodiment" cases, which arguably created un-
certainty concerning whether one was improperly reading limita-
tions in from the specification, as opposed to just interpreting the
claim term in light of the specification.
Whatever the reason may be, this past year has seen a number
of cases, starting with Texas Digital Systems, Inc. v. Telegenix,
Inc. ,2 in which the Federal Circuit has tried to lay down very clear
rules about what needs to be done to interpret claims. The Texas
Digital decision says you go to the dictionary and look up the
word.3 You get the dictionary definition first, and then go to the
specification. In other words, you go to the dictionary after you
read the claim, and then you look in the specification to see if
Partner, Jones Day, Cleveland.
Edward V. Filardi & Mark D. Baker, The Past, Present, and Future of the Federal Cir-
cuit: Practitioner Perspectives on the Law of Inequitable Conduct, Claim Construction, and the
Doctrine of Equivalents, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 823,825 (2004).
2 308 F.3d 1193 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Tex. Digital Sys. Inc., 308 F.3d at 1202-03 (explaining how dictionaries are useful tools
to aid courts' interpretations of claim meanings).
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there is any special definition that would moot the dictionary defi-
nition. If there is no special definition, you look to see if the usage
of the term in the specification is inconsistent with one or more of
the definitions that you found. If the usage of the term is inconsis-
tent with a particular definition, you toss it out. Otherwise, you
use that definition. And cases like Brookhill-Wilk 1, LLC v. Intui-
tive Surgical, Inc., which came out last summer, say that it is okay
to use more than one definition from the dictionaries if they are all
consistent with the specification of the patent.4
Some things stand out about this trend toward heavy reliance
on dictionaries. First, it seems that dictionaries are frequently con-
sulted in litigation for relatively simple terms that litigants thought
they understood at the outset. Commonly, the disputed term is not
one for which you would ordinarily go to a dictionary to under-
stand. It is not "reverse transcriptase," or "polymerase chain reac-
tion," or some other highfalutin' technical term you read and do
not understand. Rather, disputes are over terms like "lock," or
"fasten," or "control." I have even seen litigants refer to diction-
ary definitions of "the" or "said": These are all words you think
you understand but about which the parties may have a dispute
regarding the meaning in a particular context in a particular claim.
Second, no particular dictionaries are sanctioned by the court.
You can use a variety of them. It seems that Webster's Third New
International Dictionary (various editions) enjoys some favor, and
is frequently relied on by the court.5 The American Heritage Dic-
tionary is also fine.6 It is fine to use a technical dictionary, al-
though it is not frequently used for common, non-technical terms.
For example, a technical dictionary might not be the appropriate
dictionary in which to look up the word "lock."
Any litigator going into a Markman7 hearing would be remiss
not to be armed with the dictionary definition they want to have.
If you do not have one, be advised that your opposition will, and
he or she is going to get the definition they want. And you do not
want to go up on appeal without having cited the dictionary. If
you do, the Federal Circuit may, on its own, pull a dictionary off
the shelf and use it, which it is not restricted from doing for the
first time during the appeals process.
4 334 F.3d 1294, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
3 WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (various editions); see Abbott
Labs. v. Syntron Bioresearch, Inc., 334 F.3d 1343, 1350 (Fed. Cit. 2003); Optical Disc Corp. v.
Del Mar Avionics, 208 F.3d 1324, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
6 THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (4th ed. 2001); see Masco Corp. v. United
States, 303 F.3d 1316, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
7 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 387-88 (1996).
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One recent exception to this dictionary trend is the Alloc case,
which Mr. Filardi mentioned in his remarks. In Alloc, the Federal
Circuit found that a special definition (not a dictionary definition)
applied to the term in question. The striking thing, however, was
that the specification did not clearly set forth a special definition.
8
When you think of a special definition, you think of something
like the specification saying, "as used herein the term 'nucleotide'
means RNA, DNA, and so on," or something such as that. But in
Alloc, there was no "as used herein" statement; 9 it was more nebu-
lous than that. The point is that the Alloc case muddies the water
as to when a special definition in the specification trumps the dic-
tionary, and litigants will cite Alloc most commonly when they
want to narrow a claim term to the specific embodiment shown in
the patent.
From my perspective, the heightened emphasis on the use of
the dictionary is a development that will favor broad claim con-
struction, which is to say it will generally be favorable for plain-
tiffs. In addition to the need for predictability, it may be that this
trend is a reaction to the decreased availability of the doctrine of
equivalents. There is no doubt that any litigator would rather not
be relying on the doctrine of equivalents when going into court.
There is so much baggage on the doctrine, and a patent owner
would really rather have a literal infringement position. The dic-
tionary may be the litigator's best tool for getting the broadest
construction possible, and he or she may not be able to go much
beyond that using the doctrine of equivalents.
Looking forward, one question I would like to see answered
is: Will this trend bring about more predictability? And, if past
practice is any prelude to the future, maybe it will not. A second
question that should be considered is whether this is a favorable
trend for plaintiffs. My opinion is that it will be generally favor-
able for patent plaintiffs, but only time will tell.
II. THE DocTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS
The most significant limitation on the doctrine of equivalents
emerging in the past five years has not been Festo Corp. v.
Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.,10 particularly since there
is no longer a complete bar. Instead, the most significant devel-
8 Alloc, Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 342 F.3d 1361, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (Fed.
Cir. 2003).
9 Id. at 1166-67.
'0 (Festo IX) 344 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (This is the most recent of the Festo deci-
sions).
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opments have involved the so-called "all elements rule" and the
"claim vitiation" doctrine. This is a doctrine that is asserted in
every instance that a patent owner relies on the doctrine of equiva-
lents. There is virtually no circumstance under which the claim
vitiation doctrine will not be asserted by a defendant responding to
an equivalents allegation.
The doctrine stems from the Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-
Wayland, Inc. case in 1987," although that case did not talk about
it in precisely these terms. Pennwalt initiated the All Elements
Rule, which says when you are applying the doctrine of equiva-
lents, you have to do the analysis on an element-by-element basis,
not just for the accused device or invention as a whole. In other
words, you have to argue that some specific element in the accused
device is equivalent to a specific element that is literally claimed,
but not literally present in the device. 12 That principle has been
expanded through a number of cases-Sage Products, Inc. v.
Devon Industries, Inc.,13 Moore U.S.A., Inc. v. Standard Register
Co., 14 SciMed Life Systems, Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys-
tems, Inc.,' 5 and a host of others-into something that is much
more difficult to understand and apply, and is certainly much less
predictable, than estoppel.
In Moore v. Standard Register, the claim at issue involved an
envelope that had to have an adhesive around the "majority" of a
margin. The accused product had adhesive around forty-eight or
forty-nine percent of the margin. The plaintiff argued that it was
the equivalent of a majority, and there was no prosecution history
of estoppel. The Federal Circuit, however, said that the plaintiff's
equivalents argument was wrong because it would result in vitia-
tion of the element.1 6 In essence, the plaintiff's interpretation
would have meant that a minority was the equivalent of a majority,
and thus a limitation would have been read out of the claim.
Arguably, however, any time the doctrine of equivalents is
applied, one is reading a limitation out of the claim. That is why
you are applying the doctrine-it's because the device does not
literally contain the element. Thus, every time the doctrine of
equivalents is used, an argument is made that it cannot be asserted
against the accused device because it would be vitiating the claim
element.
' 833 F.2d 931 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
12 Id. at 935-36.
"3 126 F.3d 1420 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
14 229 F.3d 1091 (Fed Cir. 2000).
" 242 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
16 229 F.3d at 1106.
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There is a good article in the Federal Bar Journal from a few
years ago that tracks the usage of the doctrine of claim vitiation. 7
There is considerable variability in its application at the Federal
Circuit. The authors in that article categorize how different judges
on the court apply the doctrine. 18 The authors also offer their own
unification theory for that doctrine.' 9 In the years to come, it may
well be that this doctrine will have more impact than Festo on how
and when the doctrine of equivalents may be applied in patent liti-
gation.
17 Daniel H. Shulman & Donald W. Rupert, "Vitiating" the Doctrine of Equivalents: A
New Patent Law Doctrine, 13 FED. CIR. B.J. 457 (2003).
18 Id. at 464-82.
'9 Id. at 482-88.
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